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Once upon a time, study of the effects of mergers was clearly the
province of specialists in industrial organization. But then, following
two upheavals, this turf was lost. The first change was the shift (in the
United States; less in other industrial countries) toward diversifying
mergers and away from those combining competing or vertically related
companies. The second change was the development of "event studies":
the method of inferring the profitability of mergers ex ante from changes
in stock-market values at the time when the transaction is announced.
The first change removed the bulk of acquisitions from categories
for which microeconomic theory possesses strong models. We have
lacked equally strong theories to explain the causes and the conse-
quences of diversification. Some models can explain why diversifying
mergers might improve the efficiency of resource use, while others show
that they might facilitate collusive or rent-seeking behavior. But the
yea-saying models have not attracted much interest except in business
administration; and the nay-saying models, resting on stringent as-
sumptions and hard to test empirically, have made only a modest
impression.
The second change allowed the study of mergers to be annexed in a
bloodless coup by the finance specialists. "Event studies" seem to have
everything going for them. They focus directly on the primary question
of whether mergers improve the use of scarce resources. 1 They avoid the
vexing controlled-experiment problems that plague any attempt to infer
the consequences of mergers from ex post data. And their authors pos-
sess deadly weapons for repelling skeptics who fear slippage between
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anticipations and outcomes, in the form of accumulated evidence failing
to reject the hypothesis of financial-market efficiency.
One must admire the extensive findings about the market for corpo-
rate control that have emerged from the methodology of event studies.2
he methodology s neatness certainly explains the w~despread accep-
tance of their principal normative conclusion about mergers, especially
diversifying mergers: that they create value in the eyes of shareholders,
hence presumptively involve efficient reallocations of control over re-
sources, and should therefore receive kindly treatment from public poli-
cy. Alas, this conclusion may well be wrong. In this paper I show that ex
post evidence on the efficiency of mergers, especially that developed
recently in the industrial organization camp, amounts to a convincing
rejection of the presumed efficiency of mergers. Furthermore, recent
developments in the study of corporate organization and governance
help us understand why firms enthusiastically pursue mergers that in
the end destroy value for their shareholders.
The first section briefly reviews the ex ante evidence from event
studies that supports a favorable evaluation of the efficiency of mergers.
It also considers what factors may explain the occurrence of mergers,
consistent with the world view that most finance specialists find conge-
nial: efficient capital markets and value-maximizing actors. Then we
turn to the evidence on the efficiency of mergers from the field of indus-
trial organization. There we find that the traditional modes of investigat-
ing their ex post productivity sustain a fragile case for them at best, and
several important recent investigations provide strongly negative evi-
dence. Then we turn to recent research on the economics of corporate
governance for indications why nonproductive mergers may occur. The
concluding section reviews some implications of this evidence for both
business practice and public policy.
Event Studies and the Efficiency of Mergers
The Conventional Wisdom
The evidence from event studies on the efficiency of mergers is so
extensive and consistent that a brief summary suffices. Acquisitions always
entail a large gain for the target firm’s shareholders over the market value of
the freestanding entity. The proportional gain if anything has been rising
over time and amounts to a premium of 30 percent for the change in
1Even the contribution of horizontal mergers to monopolistic distortions can be tested
by the expected value of rents that they create for competitors not involved in the merger.
2jensen and Ruback (1983) provided an excellent summary of this literature. See Cook
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corporate control via takeover, 20 percent via merger (Jensen and Ruback
1983). The average return to the bidding firm’s shareholders is less clear.
Some studies have found small but statistically significant gains, others
small losses. It seems safe to conclude that the bidder’s shareholders ap-
proximately break even. A bundle for the target’s shareholders plus zero
for the bidder’s still sums to a bundle, supporting the conclusion that
mergers create value and accordingly are economically efficient.
These results evidently invite the conclusion that mergers are profit-
able and therefore socially desirable.3 Yet the event studies themselves
leave important doubts. Have we really established that the dollar value
of the gain to bidder and target taken together is positive? Acquiring
firms are typically much larger than their targets, and the sum of the
target’s proportionally large gain and a zero-mean and variable change
in wealth.for the bidder need not sum to a significant positive value.
Firth (1980) found for British mergers that the mean sum is negative but
insignificantly different from zero. For the United States, as Roll (1986)
pointed out, relatively few studies have performed the exercise of calcu-
lating and testing the significance of mean dollar-value measures of
gain, and those have obtained insignificant positive values.4 Although
we shall continue to treat a positive ex ante dollar value of mergers as a
stylized fact for purposes of this paper, the "fact" is not established with
statistical confidence.
A second question arises for the bidding firms. If their shareholders
on average get nothing from deals that absorb .much managerial time
and other transaction costs, what keeps the bidders in the game? It is
suggested that a target (or its investment banker) can readily stage an
auction that puts bidders into a Bertrand competition that drops all the
surplus into the outstretched hands of its own shareholders. That may
be true. However, if the average bidder’s shareholders break even, that
means they lose about half the time. Do we call this random noise, or do
those shareholders correctly perceive that their wealth is impaired? This
thought certainly raises a question about the motives of bidders’ man-
agements, even if it does not impugn the creation of value by the aver-
age merger.5
3Nobody denies the possibility that private and social values diverge. However, with
diversifying mergers so prevalent, few treat the qualification as an important one. Tax
factors have been taken more seriously as sources of private-social discrepancies in U.S.
mergers; we return to them below.
4jensen and Ruback (1983, pp. 22, 47) noted this qualification while maintaining that
takeovers (if not necessarily mergers) on average generate net benefits.
sIf mergers are productive but target firms can capture the full value of expected rents,
then we should expect no relationship among mergers between the size of the gain to the
target (due to the synergy) and the valuation of the merger by the bidder’s shareholders (a
random variable). Yet the evidence shows a strong negative relationship between them;
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Some event studies have implicitly addressed this problem of what
the bidder’s shareholders are valuing. It is not necessarily the individual
merger against the alternative of "do nothing." The financial resources
expended on the merger at hand might have been used instead for
another investment in physical or corporate assets that would also create
value, though not so much. Or the market may value a bidder’s larger
strategic plan that entails a series of mergers and (perhaps) other trans-
actions; then its valuation of the individual merger "event" rates this
transaction not against "do nothing" but for its efficacy in pursuing the
preannounced strategy. Empirical evidence has given this hypothesis
only mixed support. Be that as it may, doubts about what the market is
valuing ex ante do nibble ominously at the claimed sufficiency of these
valuations for establishing the expected productivity of merger
transactions.
A third concern with the event studies arises from the behavior of
market valuations following the "event"--the announcement date of the
merger or (in a few studies) its date of consummation. At the moment a
merger is announced, securities-market participants react with what in-
formation they have at hand. As time passes, they can invest in securing
more information, and also a good deal of previously confidential infor-
mation is likely to be revealed. Expectations are likely to be refined, but
no obvious bias should carry this adjustment either upward or down-
ward. If the managers who contracted the merger hold insider informa-
tion on its productivity, of course, the post-announcement valuation
would rise.6 However, the studies that have followed post-announce-
ment valuations for bidders have observed a change that is usually nega-
tive and (when negative) statistically significant. The studies range in
temporal coverage from a month or so following the announcement to
several years after the consummation.7 The contributors to Mueller’s
(1980) international study employed a similar procedure of following
share values for acquiring firms, relative to matched enterprises or to the
average firm in the acquirer’s market. For five countries they found that
the relative value of the bidder’s shares rises in the year of the merger,
then falls off to zero or below after three years. These negative second
thoughts by bidders’ shareholders seriously qualify the inferences that
6Roll (1986) pointed to another reason: an event putatively desired by shareholders
that is probabilistic at the time of announcement later becomes certain.
7Besides the ones tabulated by Jensen and Ruback (1983), p. 21, see also Weidenbaum
and Vogt (1987); they include Dodd (1980), Eger (1983), Choi and Philippatos (1984), and
Magenheim and Mueller (1987). Magenheim and Mueller showed that the measured ex-
tent of the post-event decline may be quite sensitive to the way in which the cumulative
residuals are estimated, and specifically the degree to which the estimation period picks
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the average bidding firm breaks even and the average merger creates
value.8
Gains from Diversifying Mergers: Theory
If we accept the positive inference from event studies, the conclu-
sion that mergers are productive may require no more theoretical foun-
dation than the widely assumed disinclination of purposive individuals
to leave currency on the footpath. Many explanations have accumulated
as to why mergers should have a positive realized return to the decision-
maker. Only a few of them, however, are consistent with well-function-
ing markets and value-maximizing behavior all around. Of these, the
explanation that commands the most empirical support is "synergies"
due to the sharing between activities of "lumpy" or intangible multiuse
assets. Assume that the firm operating in a certain activity must employ
some real asset that is efficiently acquired or enlarged only in discrete
lumps, and that it cannot be readily shared between independent firms.
An intangible asset such as production know-how is the limiting case in
terms of its "excess capacity" for the firm utilizing it. Assume also that
such a lumpy asset enters into the production functions for other activi-
ties as well. Then the firm holding the underutilized asset can employ it
fully by adding another activity that requires the same asset. The oppor-
tunity cost for the firm entering this new activity will be less than for a
de novo entrant who must recruit a unit of this asset at market cost.
(Rubin (1973) provided a model of this expansion process.) Expansion
either by acquisition or green-field entry could potentially realize this
gain.
This "lumpy multiuse asset" model of diversification has a good deal
of empirical support. Economic research has associated diversification
with high levels of research and development activity (which creates
intangible assets that sometimes have diverse and unpredictable uses),
common customers, distribution systems, and channels for acquiring
inputs (Lemelin 1982; MacDonald 1985). Stewart, Harris, and Carleton
(1984) confirmed that diversifying mergers follow a similar pattern. Oth-
er support comes from the literature of business administration, where
"related diversification" has often been seen as a profitable activity to be
undertaken at an appropriate stage in the firm’s evolution (for example,
Rumelt 1974). Some investigators who analyzed market valuations of
8Krishna Palepu pointed out that it is easy for target shareholders to value a merger,
but estimating its contribution to future cash flows of the bidding firm is a complex exer-
cise (even apart from the opportunity-cost question mentioned above). The pattern of no
abnormal return to the bidder on "event day" followed by negative returns thereafter
could be read as a negative overall evaluation that emerges only after sharpened pencils
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mergers in cross section found that "related" mergers are valued more
highly than those without any apparent synergistic potential.9
A second explanation of diversifying mergers’ value lies in manage-
rial efficiency. Corporate shareholders face a public-good problem in
monitoring hired managers to assure that they obtain the maximum
value from the firm’s resources. The market for corporate control permits
a single agent (at substantial transaction cost) to obtain sufficient voting
shares to expel managers who follow suboptimal policies, and to restore
the firm to the pinnacle of optimality. Because a "raider" normally can-
not capture the full rent due to this expulsion (Grossman and Hart
1980), mergers to improve efficiency are arguably underprovided, and
takeovers are all the more to be cherished.
No strong evidence on the prevalence and success of these manage-
rial tune-ups has come to light. Event studies have found that the mar-
ket valuation of the target firm declined for a period prior to the
acquisition, suggesting managerial deficiencies that the incumbents are
not expected to cure on their own (Jensen and Ruback 1983, p. 25).l° Yet
negative abnormal returns could also stem from disturbances that de-
press the expected profitability of the firm’s bundle of resources, but in
ways remediable through consolidation with another firm. Both inter-
pretations imply that mergers are productive. Still another explanation
lies in arbitrage: when the target’s share price is depressed (for whatever
reason), acquisition is a cheap way to acquire its real assets. Because
only a little ex ante evidence uniquely indicates that managerial over-
haul motivates a merger (Palepu 1986), the hypothesis that mergers ac-
tually do shape up deficient management can really be tested only on ex
post profit or productivity data. (See below.)
Managerial shape-up and the full use of lumpy, fungible assets are
the most plausible theoretical bases for mergers’ productivity that are
consistent with efficient capital markets and wealth-maximizing behav-
ior. Numerous other hypotheses have been put forth. (Mueller 1977
provided a compact survey.) Apart from those resting on market distor-
tions (taxes; seeking rents from market power), they imply either that
capital markets suffer imperfections (the price/earnings game) or that
managers pursue goals other than maximizing value for shareholders
(maximization of growth; reduction of risk to the firm’s cash flow). One
hypothesis on the borderline holds that a nonfinancial firm could run an
efficient portfolio strategy by searching systematically for bargains in the
market for corporate control. That hypothesis is implausible in well-
9you and others (1986), who do not confirm this hypothesis, cite earlier papers that
failed to reject it.
1°Consistent with this are studies showing that target firms on average have lower
ratios of market to book value than matched firms not taken over (for example, Hindley
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developed capital markets, where "attractive companies with good man-
agements show up on everyone’s computer screen and attract top dollar
in terms of acquisition premium" (Porter 1987). Another borderline hy-
pothesis holds that, by dint of expertise and objectivity, a multibusiness
firm’s central administrative office can shunt cash flows more effectively
among controlled businesses than could the capital markets interacting
with independent business managements. That hypothesis gets a boost
from the return to respectability of the "pecking order" hypothesis of
corporate finance, which concludes that managers (for several reasons)
assign lower shadow prices to internally generated funds than to those
obtained externally (new borrowings or equity issues). For example, ex-
ternal borrowings may entail transaction costs associated with problems
of agency that can be avoided or reduced if the bidder not only transfers
surplus cash flows to the target but also assumes supervisory control
over their use.
In short, if one infers from event studies that value-maximizing
corporate managers make intendedly rational decisions, there is no
shortage of models to explain why mergers that are neither horizontal
nor vertical could represent productive uses of resources. Accordingly, a
skeptic who suspects (or finds) that a substantial proportion of mergers
are unproductive can base his doubts on two foundations. The bidding
managers may fail to maximize expected value, either because other
motives dominate their preferences or because an unrecognized bias
blights their expectations. Or, discrepancies between private and social
valuations of merged firms’ cash flows may make mergers profitable but
socially unproductive. The ex post evidence on mergers’ profitability, to
which we now turn, is crucial for distinguishing between these
alternatives.
Productivity of Mergers: Ex Post Evidence
Ex post studies of mergers’ effects may have been overshadowed by
the event-study methodology, but important evidence has nonetheless
been accumulating. Furthermore, most recent contributions are re-
soundingly negative on the average productivity of mergers and sharply
at variance with the findings of the event studies. We first review evi-
dence from studies of realized profits and productivity levels, then high-
light several new studies with strongly negative import.
Evidence on Realized Profit and Productivity
Many ex post appraisals were made of the profitability or productiv-
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1960s. While not particularly decisive, they were not on balance blatant-
ly inconsistent with the positive conclusion of the later event studies.11
Acquiring firms during the 1950s appeared to attain no excess profits
from their efforts, a result that is of course consistent with real gains that
just offset premiums paid to target firms’ shareholders. Reid’s extensive
study (1968) concluded that the profit performance (several measures) of
acquiring firms decreased with the extent of their merging activity, but
the later evidence took a more favorable turn. Weston and Mansinghka
(1971) concluded that the acquisitive conglomerates of the 1960s began
the period earning profits below those of a control group (due to capital
sunk in declining industries) but pulled themselves up to equality with
the control group. They attributed the apparent gain in productivity to
the more aggressive use of leverage, substituting tax-deductible debt for
equity and thereby transferring revenue from the U.S. Treasury to the
owners of capital. The targets’ managers apparently sinned by underex-
ploiting their borrowing power.
Later research on postmerger movements of market valuations also
underlined the importance of leverage increases: Choi and Philippatos
(1983, 1984) found negative changes in the postmerger value of the bid-
der to occur in acquisitions that were unrelated (that is, had no obvious
basis for real synergy) and entailed no substantial increase in leverage. 12
The evidence on the average outcome of mergers for acquiring firms
took a nosedive after macroeconomic conditions in the early 1970s
brought down the acquisitive conglomerates (Mueller 1977, pp. 323-5).
Thus the ex post evidence for the United States indicates overall that
acquirers realized little profit, and what they did obtain came mainly in a
private but not a social form; but the premiums to target shareholders
stand as unimpugned gains.
Great Britain has been the site of numerous studies of the results of
mergers. While their findings may not apply to the United States or
other countries, their scope and character warrant a review. Meeks
(1977) compared the actual profitability of merged companies and their
premerger components with the average of all companies classified to
their industries. In the three years preceding the acquisition, the ac-
quirers were at least one-fifth more profitable than their industries,
while their targets were about normally profitable (which of course ques-
tions the managerial shape-up hypothesis). After the merger, especially
in the third through the sixth subsequent years, the average normalized
profitability of the consolidated enterprise was significantly negative,
with approximately 60 percent of the sampled acquirers showing
11The relevant studies were surveyed by Steiner (1975, chap. 8) and Mueller (1977).
12Evidence from other countries agrees on this point. See Singh (1971, pp. 160-1) and
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losses.13 The deterioration is not associated in a simple way with merg-
ers that represent far-flung diversifications for the bidder, or with the
size of the target relative to the acquirer.
The British literature also includes two close investigations of the
effects of mergers on the surviving firm’s productivity. Newbould (1970)
intensively explored the actions that acquirers undertook to integrate
and utilize the assets absorbed in 38 mergers. Because these mergers
were horizontal, they should have provided the maximum opportunity
for synergistic gains. He found that a small minority of acquirers did
obtain each of several types of gains; overall, he concluded that half his
sample realized no gain or very little, the other half medium to high
gains. He also found that ingesting acquisitions took considerable effort
from the bidder’s management. Cowling and others (1980) also studied
productivity changes occurring in largely horizontal mergers in Britain,
using an efficiency measure that boils down to the profit margin on sales
adjusted for changes in input and output prices. None of nine mergers
that were studied intensively (Cowling and others 1980, chap. 5) exhibit-
ed extensive gains in efficiency, and two-thirds showed extensive de-
clines in the few years following the merger--declines that suggest
substantial transition costs. Other intensive studies of mergers in the
engineering and brewing industries (chaps. 6, 7) were no more positive.
In conclusion, the ex post studies of the performance of acquiring
companies in the United States provide little positive evidence for the
productivity of mergers, while the British evidence shows specifically
that any gains seem to be erased by transition costs. Although some
studies of mergers in Britain have also painted a less rosy picture (Firth
1980; compare Franks and Harris 1986) than their American counter-
parts, the British ex post evidence is not obviously irrelevant to the
United States.
Control Changes and Market Shares
We now turn to the first of three recent studies that are particularly
negative on mergers. Mueller (1985) drew upon surveys taken by the
Federal Trade Commission in 1950 and 1972 of shipments by the 1,000
largest companies in narrowly defined 5-digit product classes. He fo-
cused upon-209 companies in the 1950 study that were acquired by 123
others included in the 1,000-largest group in both years. Thus, he could
observe market shares in both years for business units that did and did
13Meeks adjusted the acquirers’ profits to eliminate premiums paid for the target’s
assets. He also deleted 20 outliers from his sample of 233 observations; if they are re-
tained, the apparent decline in postmerger relative profitability is much larger than the 4
to 10 percent reported after their elimination. His results are consistent with earlier studies
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not undergo changes in control. His data imply that an unacquired busi-
ness on average retained 88 percent of its 1950 market share in 1972,
while an acquired one retained only 18 percent! Part of the decline could
well have taken place before the changes in control, which of course
were distributed over the period. However, the size of the declines
coupled with the relatively weak evidence of debilitated premerger prof-
its of target firms (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987, chap. 3) leave little
doubt that significant declines in market shares followed changes in
control.
The sample included both diversifying and horizontal mergers, and
the latter were examined separately for the theoretical reason that a
horizontal acquisition undertaken to exploit market power must (on
Cournot assumptions) give up some market share in order to attain its
goal. The share losses for horizontal acquisitions were indeed even larg-
er than for diversifying ones, but an enormous decline remains for the
latter.
Mueller’s results are naturally subject to various qualifications, such
as mergers (by both the acquiring and the control firms) outside of the
1,000-largest sample. However, the dramatic size of the share declines
seems blatantly inconsistent with any persistent efficiency gain from
mergers, implying instead that enterprises seeking to run acquired busi-
ness units on average underperform their previous specialized manag-
ers, or at best fail to improve on their records.
Business-Unit Profitability and Divested Acquisitions
In the early 1970s not a few of the "go-go conglomerates" of the
1960s were dismantled, and late in the decade it became a commonplace
observation that many acquired business units were being resold or re-
established as independent firms (Porter 1987). On the face of it, firms
divesting businesses that they have acquired need not be burying their
mistakes. On the one hand, some gains from merger are one-shot. The
badly run business can be bought, its managerial cadre shaken up, and
turned loose again as an independent entity. The business that benefits
from receiving an infusion of intangibles from its acquirer or supplying
them to the acquirer can also be turned loose once it has received the
indicated transfusion. The acquirer might as well perform the value-
creating deed and then capitalize the value of its achievement. Divest-
ments, in principle, need not indicate failed mergers. On the other
hand, the bumbling acquirer who has spoiled the profitability of a good
business can rectify its mistake by reselling the unit only if the damage is
temporary and reversible by a management with a greener thumb. Oth-
erwise, the loss is unavoidable and can be realized but not reversed by
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With these points recognized, the observer is nonetheless im-
pressed with the many doleful tales: "We bought Business X but then
found out we didn’t know how to run it, and so are putting it back on
the market." Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, chap. 5) undertook a series
of case studies of acquired businesses that went through a divestment
cycle, confirming this conventional wisdom from the business press.
Some acquirers tripped over a "lemons" problem, learning after the
transaction of substantial problems with the acquired business that they
had not previously spotted. The acquirer’s managerial outsiders then
were ineffective at providing a fix. Yet the opportunity cost of managerial
effort was high and figured as strongly in the divestment decision as the
opportunity cost of funds. The cases are consistent with the view that
multibusiness companies have certain repertories of skills and control/
evaluation/reward structures that work well for a subset of businesses
but are apt to fumble when extended into new areas.
In their statistical analysis, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, chaps. 3,
4) used the Federal Trade Commission’s Line of Business data for an
intensive study of changes in profitability of narrowly defined business
units that had undergone changes in control, with special attention to
the occurrence of sell-offs. By means of the 1950 FTC survey (also used
by Mueller), they were able to identify businesses of the large companies
responding to the 1977 Line of Business survey that had experienced
changes in control. An important dividend of this study is information
on the premerger profitability of many target firms too small to be pub-
licly traded. It turns out these small units were highly profitable, while
profits of larger acquired businesses were not substantially below aver-
age (a finding that agrees with other investigators). In assessing the
profitability of business units that had been acquired, they controlled for
profit opportunities either with a fixed-effects model or with the stan-
dard exogenous variables indicating profit opportunities.14 Their evi-
dence clearly shows that acquired businesses suffered a substantial
deterioration of profitability. In their most carefully constrained sample,
the profitability during 1974-77 of business units acquired in single
mergers was down by one-half from their premerger profitability; yet
their rates of asset growth were rapid, so they were not being milked as
cash cows.
Ravenscraft and Scherer found that during 1974-81 one-fifth of the
business units reporting Line of Business data during 1974-77 were sold
off. At the earliest time they could be observed (seven years before sell-
off), these units’ profits were 66 percent below the average for all report-
ing units, and they tended strongly toward negative values as the day of
14A distinctive feature of this study by Ravenscraft and Scherer is its careful attention
to the effect of a merger’s accounting treatment on the subsequent measurement of the
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expulsion approached. The pre-acquisition profits of these units were no
different from those of acquired businesses not sold off during this peri-
od. Sell-off was more likely for businesses that the owner had acquired
since 1950 and for those diversified from the parent’s industrial base.
Thus, the important Ravenscraft-Scherer study shows that mergers
on average had substantial negative effects on the real profitability of
acquired business units, and that the booming market in corporate divi-
sions is importantly fueled by diversified companies that are disposing
of their worst mistakes.
Technical Efficiency and Corporate Diversification
The third recent study to question the productivity of mergers is one
that I am completing in collaboration with David R. Barton. We use the
methodology of stochastic frontier production functions to assess the
extent to which plants classified to various 4-digit U.S. manufacturing
industries in 1977 displayed productivity levels below the attainable
frontier. The methodology proceeds from the standard statistical estima-
tion of a production function, but it assumes that the error term com-
prises two components, the usual normally distributed random error
and another asymmetrically distributed (half-normal, for example) com-
ponent indicating the dispersion of inefficient plants below the frontier.
The observed residual--the sum of these two components--is expected
to have a skewed distribution, a prediction confirmed by the data for a
satisfyingly high proportion of industries. The variance of the one-sided
distribution indicating technical inefficiency can be inferred under quite
general assumptions.
Our objective was to discover the average extent of technical ineffi-
ciency and, even more, to determine what factors explain its variation
from industry to industry. Our interest in the average evaporated when
we discovered that the several reasonable ways of expressing it in a form
comparable among industries yield wildly divergent results. Fortunate-
ly, interindustry differences in these measures are highly correlated de-
spite their different means. We confirmed a number of hypotheses the
important one for present purposes being that technical efficiency de-
creases significantly as the extent of corporate diversification increases.
We used two measures of this end product of mergers. The extent of
inbound diversification is inferred from the proportion of shipments that
emanate from plants classified to the industry at hand controlled by
firms based in other industries. The extent of outbound diversification is
measured by the proportion of shipments by firms classified to this in-
dustry emanating from plants which they control that are classified to
other industries. The sum of these measures has a highly significa~nt
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of inbound diversification by itself. Outbound diversification takes a
smaller coefficient and is only marginally significant statistically. This
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that multibusiness companies
do a poor job of managing business units that are remote from their
industrial base, and that efforts to do so have a negative though less
substantial and predictable effect on the efficiency of their base activities.
The obvious negative implications of this analysis for diversifying
mergers require careful qualification. First, we cannot distinguish be-
tween diversification attained by merger and by other means. Second,
while the statistical association between diversification and inefficiency
is strong, the methodology does not specifically identify the plants of
diversified companies as the ones that bring up the rear of the productiv-
ity distribution. A third qualification, which we could address with our
data, lies in the facts that (1) research-intensive industries appear techni-
cally inefficient (because of incompletely diffused innovations and com-
petitors’ uneven success in the inventive race), and (2) diversification
and research intensity are strongly associated, as we know from other
evidence. We allowed the effect of inbound diversification on technical
efficiency to differ between industries with high and low ratios of re-
search and development outlays to sales, finding that diversification
erodes efficiency in both groups but more in the low-R&D sector. Thus,
in context of the studies by Mueller (1985) and Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1987) summarized above, these results seem to add substantially to the
negative evidence on the ex post efficiency of mergers. In particular,
they indicate substantial declines in the real productivity of acquired
assets, not merely that acquirers fail to create enough value to justify
their acquisition premiums.
Managerial Transaction Costs
Popular discussion has flagged another possible source of inefficien-
cies from mergers that has not been documented in the research litera-
ture. It is that merger activity distracts managers excessively from
maximizing the productivity of the resources that they currently super-
vise. The threat of acquisition is supposed to constrain managers to
deploying resources for short-run payouts, implying that problems of
agency and asymmetrical information between managers and the finan-
cial markets keep the managers from maximizing the value of the firm
over a long time horizon. The evidence that we have documents the
high effort-cost of effecting mergers for acquiring managers (Newbould
1970), and a good deal of casual evidence suggests that the productivity
of an acquired firm drops sharply in the short run while everyone con-
jectures on the course of the axe’s descent. However, the best attempt to
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activity on the level of research and development outlays (Hall 1987)-
came up with nothing. This hypothesis remains open.
Tax Incentives for Mergers
While our concern in this paper is not chiefly with discrepancies
between mergers’ public and private returns, we can note some recent
evidence from Auerbach and Reishus (1987a, 1987b) on the effects of
taxation on the pecuniary gains from mergers. They sampled 322 acqui-
sitions of publicly traded companies, mostly during 1976-82, generating
(1987a) direct measures of the sizes of benefits stemming from various
tax provisions. The tax-loss carryforwards of one company can be used
to offset taxable earnings of the other. This practice they found present
in about one-fifth of all mergers, with the average benefit 10.5 percent of
the value of the acquired firm--substantial in relation to the premium
paid for control. Also significant although harder to measure is the gain
from writing up the depreciable basis of the acquired property--a small
gain in their estimation but subject to substantial underestimation. For
their time period, however, they did not confirm the evidence from
earlier periods (summarized by Weston 1981, pp. 30-33) that mergers
were important occasions for increasing the acquirer’s leverage. During
1976-82, they note, leverage increases were common among nonmerg-
ing firms.
Auerbach and Reishus also (1987b) sought to discriminate between
the tax-related opportunities of merging and nonmerging firms. The
influence of tax-loss carryforwards was significant in some specifications
but not economically important; no robust influence of write-up oppor-
tunities was found. Thus, the tax motives for mergers seem to be quanti-
tatively substantial but not demonstrably important among the factors
inducing corporate mergers.
What To Make of It?
We have a conundrum. Ex ante, mergers appear to create value for
bidder and target together that is substantial relative to the premerger
worth of the target firm. That is, the financial markets appear to believe
that bidders can wring a lot more value from the typical target’s assets.
Ex post, recent studies run exactly in the opposite direction, indicating
that mergers reduce the real profitability of acquired business units,
shrivel their market shares, and increase the intra-industry dispersion of
plants’ productivity levels.
Attempts to reconcile these results could proceed along several
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be so apparently wrong. I duck this issue except to recall a colleague’s
formulation of adaptive expectations: "People do pretty stupid things,
but they wise up eventually." It is more fruitful to proceed in the direc-
tion favored by industrial organization economists, namely, to examine
the cross-section variance of merger experience for clues as to why some
mergers yield more value than others. Most event studies and some ex
post assessments of mergers’ value have emphasized average experi-
ence and not the variance of cases and the factors explaining it. Clearly,
not all cats are black, nor are all mergers bad. If mergers create value ex
ante, it remains true that at least a large minority of acquiring firms’
shareholders suffer losses in value. If average market valuations of ac-
quiring companies drop off after the acquisition, it remains true that
around 40 percent of them increase. Our ultimate question thus is what
explains those mergers that work out badly, or which ones were as-
sessed with inadequate pessimism at the time of announcement.
Recent work on managerial behavior certainly supplies part of the
answer. Jensen (1986) hurled down the charge that managers can gain
utility from diverting "free cash flow" to projects that yield low expected
returns but provide various rewards to the firm’s managerial cadre. He
thus restates a traditional concern of industrial organization with the
"split between ownership and control" (Berle and Means) and the "exer-
cise of managerial utility" (Williamson).15 If unproductive mergers may
result from a bargain between shareholders and managers that is incom-
plete, or incompletely monitored, then we have at the least a basis for
explaining why value-destroying mergers can occur.
That managerial behavior can affect mergers is usually heard nowa-
days in a different context. The spotlight falls on target-firm managers,
because golden parachutes, greenmail, poison pills, and other feverish
contrivances may function to preserve managerial rents at the expense
of shareholders. 16 Of course, less cynical explanations also abound, for
these devices may also serve as ploys for getting the shareholders a
better deal, guarantees of postponed managerial compensation against
expropriation, or other such impeccable roles. However those compet-
lSOne might suggest that Jensen reprises a tune heard often before in earlier research
on mergers: they achieve growth for the sake of opportunities for the managerial cadre or
the pecuniary benefits growth provides them; mergers reduce risk not to the shareholders
but to employees whose utility diminishes with the variance of outcomes for the firm;
mergers that enlarge the firm also make its independence~and its top managers’ jobs--
more defensible against would-be acquirers. See, for example, Reid (1968), Newbould
(1970), and Mueller (1977). For evidence associating mergers with the compensation con-
tracts of bidders’ managements, see Firth (1980), Larcker (1983), and Lewellen, Loderer,
and Rosenfeld (1985).
16For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1987) found clear evidence that a target
management hostile to a takeover was apt to be underperforming (low market/book value)
and have a small equity stake in the firm.164 Richard E. Caves
ing hypotheses may be resolved, much less attention has gone to man-
agerial behavior by bidders’ managers. Nonetheless, what we have does
lay significant blame at that door. You and others (1986) investigated in
cross section the excess returns to bidding firms’ shareholders and found
that shareholders fare worse, the smaller is the proportion of the bid-
der’s shares held by managers and directors, and the larger the propor-
tion of the board of directors composed of insiders. This result ties the
diversion of "free cash flow" specifically to managerial incentive struc-
tures and the effectiveness of the board as a monitor on shareholders’
behalf.
Other evidence also supports the hypothesis that free cash flow
provides a major opportunity for bidding firms’ managers to divert
funds to low-value uses. A series of papers beginning with Baumol and
others (1970) investigated the rate of return imputed to cash flows in-
vested by large, mature corporations, finding it very low indeed. This
result by itself does not decisively point to managerial behavior, because
of the advantage to (some) shareholders of converting potential divi-
dends into (then) more lightly taxed capital gains. But it is consistent
with Jensen’s hypothesis of contention over free cash flow, as well as
with the diffuse evidence that acquiring firms tend to be cash-rich. 17
Conclusions and Implications for Industrial Organization
and Market Performance
Conclusions
We have reached the following conclusions:
(1) Evidence from event studies has been widely read as confirming
the efficiency of the typical corporate merger. While it does confirm
substantial gains to the owners of target firms, the evidence for signifi-
cant gain to target and bidder together is in fact thin.
(2) Theoretical bases exist for synergistic gains from mergers, out-
side of those between horizontally or vertically related firms, but little
evidence connects the empirical achievement of these gains to merger
transactions.
(3) The thrust of evidence accumulated in the past on the ex post
profitability of mergers is that the average acquiring firm at best realizes
no net profit on its consolidated assets.IS
17The tendency for bidding firms to enjoy positive excess returns in the months be-
fore a merger may be read as evidence that good news resulting in higher earnings causes
managers to undertake a spending spree on mergers (Franks and Harris 1986).
Depending on accounting practices and the method of measuring profitability, these
studies may indicate either that mergers create no value at all, or that the gains do not
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(4) Recent studies show that business units that have been through
changes in control on average suffer substantial declines in profitability
and losses in market share; industries with many such business units
show enlarged gaps between average and best-practice plant productiv-
ity levels.
(5) There has been some concern that utility maximization by target
managers precludes beneficial mergers. Less appreciated until recently
has been the evidence that the managers who make acquisitions that
destroy wealth for their shareholders are those in a position to pursue
goals other than their shareholders’ welfare.
Implications
These results have numerous implications for economic behavior
and public policy. We can start with issues of corporate governance and
management. It is hard to state the implications for business managers,
when one is unsure whether they are part of the problem or part of the
solution. Roll’s (1986) assessment suggests managers require a stern lec-
ture on the sin of hubris, with an excursion into such statistical issues as
the winner’s curse and the importance of relying on available a posteri-
ori evidence (on the proportion of mergers that succeed) and not just
subjective judgments on the proposal at hand (we can do it!).
However, other evidence (You and others 1986) suggests that the
problem lies in the agency relationship between managers and share-
holders. We know that a "clean" story can be told about this bargain:
shareholders know ex ante that managers’ utility embraces the policies
that they are allowed to pursue, and so the owners offer a compensation
package that optimally trades off pecuniary compensation against the
managers’ scope for actions that increase their utility at the expense of
shareholders’ wealth. The trouble is that owners who would monitor
managers ex post (raiders included) face significant transaction costs.
Furthermore, finding real-life counterparts of these fictive corporate
charters is no easy task they fall to hand more readily in the literature
on corporate governance than in the file cabinets of Wilmington, Dela-
ware.
At this point public policy becomes relevant. While I shall not re-
view the possibilities here, a case certainly stands for tax and other
policies that encourage managers to return free cash flow to sharehold-
ers (through dividends and stock repurchases) rather than invest it in
mergers and other low-yield projects.
Economists and others have been concerned with diverse possible
consequences of mergers that so far have gone unmentioned in this
paper. They may increase concentration, raise collusive potential (even
across markets), aid the rationalization of excess capacity, make firms166 Richard E. Caves
more effective in competing with large foreign rivals, and so on. I have
put these questions aside because of the primacy of the question wheth-
er mergers increase the productivity of resources. If assets subjected to a
change in corporate control cannot be used effectively, the rug is
snapped smartly from beneath any hypothesized consequence of merg-
ers that depends upon value-maximizing behavior by the merging firm.
With that precondition in doubt, let me offer a few (no doubt high-
handed) propositions about mergers’ effects on industrial organization:
(1) Outside the United States where horizontal mergers are much
more prevalent, the same studies that cast doubt on their positive contri-
bution to resource productivity confirm their traditionally expected ef-
fects on price (for example, Cowling and others 1980). Williamson’s
(1968) trade-off between allocative efficiency and cost minimization may
be no trade-off at all.
(2) Some event studies have claimed that horizontal mergers do not
have monopolistic effects, because competitors’ share values do not rise
as they would if the merged firm were expected to contract output or
hold the price umbrella a little higher. Could these shareholders appreci-
ate (as Newbould 1970 found) that their own managers might react to a
competitor’s bad merger by undertaking a bad merger of their own?
(3) Is there any evidence to support the widespread faith that na-
tional firms enlarged through mergers become more effective at dealing
with their overseas rivals? I shall simply assert that I have never seen
such a case convincingly documented. 19 More to the point, an extensive
project on the bases for success of national industries in international
markets, now being completed by Michael E. Porter, reveals on gener-
ous interpretation two cases out of 110 in which a firm with effective
rivalry in its home market absent or suppressed has gone on to triumph
against overseas rivals.
(4) Are horizontal mergers effective for rationalizing resources in
contracting industries? This is the one form of asset redeployment for
which mergers have shown some aptitude (for example, Cowling and
others 1980, chap. 6). The closures and transfers of facilities that mergers
effect could in principle be done in other ways, but a merger transaction
may sometimes serve to upset obsolete but rent-yielding contracts and
end bargaining stalemates more effectively than other methods of
recontracting.
19Those who put it forth display no familiarity with the Cournot-based proposition
that a consolidated firm in quest of maximum profits will produce less than its erstwhile
independent components.EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY 167
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The title of Richard Caves’s paper is "The Effects of Mergers and
Acquisitions on the Economy." However, the bulk of the paper deals
with a review of the empirical evidence concerning the effects of these
transactions on the profitability of the combining firms.
Economists and others have been concerned with diverse possible
consequences of mergers that so far have gone unmentioned in this paper.
They may increase concentration, raise collusive potential (even across
markets), aid the rationalization of excess capacity, make firms more active
in competing with large foreign rivals, and so on. I have put these ques-
tions aside because of the primacy of the question whether mergers in-
crease the productivity of resources. If assets subjected to a change in
corporate control cannot be used effectively, the rug is snapped smartly
from beneath any hypothesized consequence of mergers that depends
upon value-maximizing behavior by the merging firm (Caves 1987).
In other words, before one can argue that corporate mergers in-
crease social welfare, one must first show that these transactions in-
crease the value or productivity of the assets of the combining firms.
I wholeheartedly agree with this premise but strongly disagree with
Caves’s interpretation of the existing evidence.
Caves begins his inquiry into the profitability of corporate mergers
and acquisitions with a critical examination of the empirical evidence
provided by financial economics. In his review of so-called "event stud-
ies," he readily admits that this body of empirical evidence universal-
ly shows that corporate acquisitions reallocate corporate resources to
higher-valued uses.
*Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, and Adjunct As-
sociate Professor of Law, Law School, University of Michigan.170 Michael Bradley
The evidence from event studies on the efficiency of mergers is so
extensive and consistent that a brief summary suffices. Acquisitions al-
ways entail a large gain for the target firm’s shareholders over the market
value of the free-standing entity.... The average return to the bidding
firm’s shareholders is less clear. Some studies have found small but statisti-
cally significant gains, others small losses. It seems safe to conclude that
the bidder’s shareholders approximately break even. A bundle for the
target’s shareholders plus zero for the bidder’s still sums to a bundle,
supporting the conclusion that mergers create value and accordingly are
economically efficient (Caves 1987).
This passage serves as an adequate summary of empirical work
from the field of financial economics. Moreover, Caves is correct in
pointing out that, to date, event studies have yet to establish that the
dollar value of the gain to the target and bidder taken together is posi-
tive. I am sure that he will be pleased to learn that I have recently
completed a study with Professors Desai and Kim that attempts to fill
this void in the empirical literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim 1987).
In this paper we estimate the combined return to matched pairs of
targets and bidders involved in interfirm tender offers over the period
1962-84. Our sample consists of all successful tender offers where both
the target and acquiring firms were listed on either the New York Stock
Exchange or the American Stock Exchange at the time of the offer. Our
selection criteria yield a sample of 236 successful combinations.
The major finding of the study is that the average successful tender
offer generates a statistically significant 7.4 percent revaluation of the
combined resources of the two firms. This 7.4 percent translates into an
average value creation of $117 million, stated in December 1984 dollars.
Our subperiod analysis reveals that the percentage synergistic gain cre-
ated by successful offers has remained remarkably constant over time.
However, the average dollar gain created by the offers in the 1981-84
period is more than double the gain created in the earlier periods. The
average synergistic gain created by these 1981-84 tender offers is in ex-
cess of $218 million because the average target is three times larger than
it was in the early 1960s. We also find that the gains to target stock-
holders have increased over time, whereas those to acquiring firms have
decreased. In fact in the 1981-84 subperiod, the stockholders of acquir-
ing firms suffered a significant capital loss of almost 3 percent. However,
the total gain to these acquisitions is a significant 8 percent. This result
demonstrates the danger of examining the returns to acquiring firms in
isolation. While there is evidence that the acquirers in the most recent
period paid too much for the targets they acquired, these acquisitions
still created significant synergistic gains.
Caves characterizes event studies as providing ex ante evidence
regarding the efficiency of corporate mergers and acquisitions. The sec-DISCUSSION 171
ond part of his paper is a review of what he terms ex post studies from
the field of industrial organization. These studies involve measuring the
effects of mergers and acquisitions on the performance of acquiring
firms using the more traditional standards of industrial organization:
accounting numbers, market share, and technological efficiency. Before I
comment on the particular studies that Caves cites, let me note from the
outset that I think that this area of research is very important if we are
ever going to understand the nature of corporate combinations. Examin-
ing the ex post performance of acquiring firms will undoubtedly provide
insights regarding the underlying motivation of these and other corpo-
rate control transactions.
The industrial organization studies employing accounting measures
of performance are by and large consistent with the results of event
studies. However, a study by Mueller in 1985 shows that on average, an
unacquired business retained 88 percent of its 1950 market share in 1972,
while an acquiring one retained only 18 percent. Caves interprets this
result as important evidence that corporate acquisitions do not enhance
efficiency. While it is impossible to evaluate the merits of Mueller’s study
from the brief description offered in the current paper, the difficulty in
defining market share at a point in time is well known, let alone defining
changes in market shares from 1950 to 1972. I would venture to say that
many, if not most, of the markets that existed in 1972 did not exist in
1950.
Caves goes on to cite the results of studies by Porter and by Ravens-
craft and Scherer as evidence contrary to the thesis that corporate merg-
ers increase economic efficiency. Essentially these authors examine the
history of divested business units. They find that a significant number of
these divestments involved assets that were previously acquired by the
divesting firms. They interpret these transactions as evidence of failed
acquisitions. Caves does point out that all divestitures do not involve
assets that were obtained through a merger or acquisition; nor do they
necessarily reflect failed ventures on the part of the divesting firm. These
qualifications having been made, he goes on to argue that these transac-
tions cast serious doubts as to the ability of acquiring firms to run their
acquired assets efficiently. On a previous occasion, I noted that examin-
ing divestitures to gain insights into the nature of corporate acquisitions
is like trying to understand the institution of marriage by interviewing
only divorced couples. I just can’t see how this line of inquiry will im-
prove our understanding of the nature of corporate acquisitions.
The last piece of evidence that Caves offers comes from his own
work with David Barton. Their work indicates that diversified firms are
not run as efficiently as sole-purpose firms. From this result he con-
cludes that diversifying acquisitions are not efficient because diversify-
ing firms are, on average, operated less efficiently. Here again it is hard172 Michael Bradley
to see how this finding helps us understand the welfare implications of
corporate mergers. I am skeptical that we can even meaningfully distin-
guish among horizontal, vertical, and diversifying combinations.
In the end, Caves concludes:
We have a conundrum. Ex ante, mergers appear to create value for the
bidder and target together .... Ex post, recent studies run exactly in the
opposite direction... (Caves 1987).
He then goes on to sketch out several lines of research that might
reconcile these apparently conflicting results. However, he misses the
most obvious. Why not conduct one study that combines the method-
ology of event studies with the more traditional approaches of industrial
organization? One could then test directly whether capital market agents
were able ex ante to anticipate the ex post performance of acquiring
firms. I suspect that firms with poor post-acquisition performance also
realized a less than average capital gain when the acquisition was an-
nounced. But this is an empirical question that can be answered with
existing data and methodology. Unless and until the empirical results of
event studies are reconciled directly with the empirical work on post-
acquisition performance, I am afraid that the arguments made by finan-
cial economists and industrial organization specialists concerning the
welfare implications of corporate mergers will continue to pass like ships
in the night.
Finally, it should be noted once again that studying only the ex post
performance of ~acquiring firms can, and most probably will, lead to
misleading conclusions. Since all serious empirical work finds that target
stockholders capture the lion’s share of the synergistic gains created by
corporate mergers, one cannot focus exclusively on the ex post perfor-
mance of acquiring firms to infer the welfare implications of these
transactions.
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